Say Aah!  Maryland v. King Defines Reasonable Standard for DNA Searches by Deitrich, Lauren
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 49 
Number 3 Spring 2015 pp.1095-1105 
Spring 2015 
Say Aah! Maryland v. King Defines Reasonable Standard for DNA 
Searches 
Lauren Deitrich 
lauren.deitrich@valpo.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren Deitrich, Say Aah! Maryland v. King Defines Reasonable Standard for DNA Searches, 49 Val. U. L. 
Rev. 1095 (2015). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/17 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access 
by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso 
University Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 1095
Comment 
SAY AAH!  
MARYLAND V. KING DEFINES REASONABLE 
STANDARD FOR DNA SEARCHESΨ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Maryland law allows the collection and testing of DNA on persons 
arrested, but not yet convicted of serious crimes.1  Whether the enacted 
legislation is constitutionally sound presents the central issue for the 
Supreme Court to decide.2  The Fourth Amendment has stood guard 
against unreasonable search and seizures since its construction.3  In 
determining what constitutes a search, the Supreme Court has 
responded that “any intrusion into the human body” will suffice.4  
Currently, twenty-eight states and the federal government have adopted 
some version of a DNA Collection Act that permits the state to obtain a 
DNA sample from a selected group of individuals.5  For example, in 
Maryland, persons convicted of “a crime of violence or an attempt to 
commit a crime of violence” are subject to provide DNA to law 
enforcement authorities.6  While the Fourth Amendment allows lawful 
search and seizures of individuals, the Supreme Court has developed a 
                                                 
Ψ Winner of the 2014 Valparaiso University Law Review Case Comment Competition. 
1 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2–504 (West 2009) (stating guidelines for when the 
collection of DNA samples may be collected in Maryland).  The state statute notes that 
individuals charged with a crime of violence, or an attempt to commit a crime of violence, 
may have their DNA collected.  Id.; see also MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14–101 (West 
2013) (defining crimes of violence in Maryland); Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Rules DNA 
Can Be Taken After Arrest, NPR (June 3, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2013/06/ 
03/188397999/supreme-court-rules-arrest-dna-collection-reasonable, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2GBR-ZNR7 (reviewing the Maryland v. King decision and the standard 
for allowing DNA collection of persons arrested, but not yet convicted of felony crimes 
based on the Maryland DNA Collection Act). 
2 Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–66 (2013).  The Court granted 
certiorari to address whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits collection and analysis of 
DNA samples from persons arrested, but not yet convicted on felony charges.  Id. 
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing, in part, “[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated”). 
4 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (quoting Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
5 See Totenberg, supra note 1 (reporting over half of the states, in addition to the federal 
government, have enacted laws for DNA withdrawal on arrested individuals). 
6 See PUB. SAFETY § 2–504(3)(i) (explaining that a DNA sample may be collected from an 
individual charged with a crime of violence or an attempt to commit a crime of violence). 
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totality of the circumstances test to assist in determining the 
reasonableness of such a search.7 Part II first introduces the facts in 
Maryland v. King.8  Next, Part III of this Comment discusses the legal 
background of search and seizures under the Fourth Amendment with 
emphasis on the Court’s procedure for determining reasonableness and 
law enforcement’s application of DNA sampling.9  Finally, Part IV 
presents the Court’s holding in King, arguing the appropriateness of the 
majority opinion, and discussing future consequences of its application 
on DNA search and seizures.10 
II.  STATEMENT OF THE FACTS IN MARYLAND V. KING 
On April 10, 2009, in Wicomico County, Maryland, Alonzo King 
(“King”) was arrested and charged with first- and second-degree assault 
for menacing a group of individuals with a shotgun.11  The Maryland 
DNA Collection Act (“Act”), in accordance with the Maryland Public 
Safety Act, obtained a sample of King’s DNA through the use of a buccal 
swab to the inside of his cheek.12  The DNA sample was processed and 
generated a match to a DNA sample from an unsolved rape case six 
                                                 
7 See U.S. CONST. amend IV (providing pertinent language regarding the 
constitutionality of search and seizures); see also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 652 (1995) (discussing “reasonableness” as the “ultimate measure of [Fourth 
Amendment] constitutionality”); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299–300 (1999) 
(stating a court must weigh “the promotion of legitimate governmental interests” against 
“the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy”); Illinois v. 
McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (explaining the use of a balance test between “privacy-
related and law enforcement-related concerns” rather than a per se rule to determine the 
reasonableness of intrusion); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) (noting that 
not all intrusions are restricted, but those unjustified or conducted improperly are 
constrained under the Fourth Amendment). 
8 See infra Part II (providing the factual background of Maryland v. King). 
9 See infra Part III (reciting the legal history of search and seizures as they relate to the 
Maryland v. King decision). 
10 See infra Part IV (analyzing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Maryland v. King). 
11 King v. State (King I), 42 A.3d 549, 553 (Md. 2012), rev’d 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
12 See id. at 553 (stating personnel at the Wicomico County Central Booking facility 
obtained King’s DNA).  The Maryland DNA Collection Act authorized the sampling of 
King’s DNA because he was charged with first- and second- degree assault.  Id.; see also 
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14–101 (West 2013) (outlining crimes of violence in 
Maryland); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2–504 (West 2009) (stating Maryland’s 
guidelines for when DNA samples may be collected). 
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years prior.13  Based on the match, the circuit court for Wicomico County 
tried and convicted King for the 2003 rape.14 
On appeal, following the denied motion to suppress evidence, King 
argued the constitutionality of the Act as it applies to search and seizures 
under the Fourth Amendment.15  The Court of Appeals reversed the 
judgment finding the collection of King’s DNA to be an unlawful seizure 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.16  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to consider whether the search using a buccal swab to obtain 
King’s DNA sample after arrest for a serious offense was reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.17 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND OF MARYLAND V. KING 
The Fourth Amendment provides that “the right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.”18  Primarily the function of 
the Fourth Amendment is to constrain against unjustified intrusions or 
those conducted improperly.19  Perhaps the greatest measure of 
                                                 
13 King I, 42 A.3d at 553.  The Maryland State Police Forensic Sciences Division processed 
and analyzed King’s DNA sample.  Id.  On July 13, 2009, King’s DNA record was uploaded 
to the Maryland DNA database and less than a month later, on August 4, 2009, the 
database produced a “hit” on King’s DNA to an unsolved 2003 rape case.  Id. 
14 Id. at 552, 554.  The hit on King’s DNA matched the DNA taken from Vonette W., a 
fifty-three year old female who was the victim of an unsolved rape case.  Id. at 554.  Vonette 
underwent an examination for sexual assault, which included a vaginal swab.  Id.  Semen 
was collected from Vonette’s exam and was uploaded to the Maryland DNA database.  
King I, 42 A.3d at 554.  At the time it was processed, no matches were generated.  Id.  
However, a detective on the case later presented the August 4 hit on King’s DNA to a 
Wicomico County grand jury, who returned an indictment against King.  Id.  The DNA hit 
“was the only evidence of probable cause supporting the [October 13, 2009] indictment” 
against King for the unsolved rape of Vonette W.  Id. 
15 Id. at 555. 
16 Id. at 555–56.  The Court of Appeals held the DNA search of King was 
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment “totality of the circumstances balancing 
test.”  King, 42 A.3d at 555–56.  The court stated “King’s expectation of privacy [was] 
greater than the State’s purported interest.”  Id. at 556.  In considering King’s situation, the 
court concluded the evidence against him at trial “should have been suppressed as ‘fruit of 
the poisonous tree.’”  Id. 
17 Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1966 (2013). 
18 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
19 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966) (“the Fourth Amendment’s 
proper function is to constrain, not against all intrusions as such, by against intrusions 
which are not justified . . . or which are made in an improper manner”). 
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constitutionality in regard to searches is ascertained in asking whether 
the search was “reasonable.”20 
Traditionally, the Court employed a balance test between 
governmental concerns and those of individuals, measured by the 
degree of the intrusion on a person’s privacy.21  In Bell v. Wolfish, the 
Court noted one’s expectation of privacy is of a “diminished scope” 
when taken into police custody.22  Furthermore, cases of special law 
enforcement needs have been introduced in which the Court deemed 
certain circumstances reasonable even though warrantless.23 
Law enforcement’s implementation of DNA testing has an 
undisputed potential to improve investigative practices and the criminal 
justice system.24  The Supreme Court has long held the buccal swab 
                                                 
20 See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995) (citing Fourth 
Amendment text, which states “reasonableness” is the ultimate measure of 
constitutionality with regard to governmental searches). 
21 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(reviewing an individual’s expectation of privacy and a physical intrusion of that 
individual’s home).  In Katz, the Court held that a person’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy is constitutionally protected and that an intrusion into a person’s home and space 
may constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.  Id.; see also Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 
295, 300 (1999) (evaluating a search by “assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it 
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed 
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests”); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 
331 (2001) (implementing a balance test to determine if a search is reasonable under the 
Fourth Amendment).  See generally Shane Crotty, Note, The Aerial Dragnet:  A Drone-ing 
Need for Fourth Amendment Change, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 219, 233–37 (2014) (providing an 
expanded explanation of Katz, specifically how the decision effected searches and seizures 
associated with drones). 
22 See 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979) (stating a detainee’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
while residing in institutional confinement is of a “diminished scope”); see also Florence v. 
Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1517 (2012) (explaining 
that searches within correctional facilities may be considered reasonable as part of the 
facilities’ effort to deter and detect contraband from entering the facility).  The Court in 
Florence stated “[m]aintaining institutional security and preserving internal order and 
discipline are essential goals that may require limitation or retraction of retained 
constitutional rights of both convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees.”  Id. (quoting Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546 (1979)). 
23 See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 328, 334 (1990) (discussing a protective sweep of an 
individual’s home, who is suspected of committing armed robbery, does not require police 
to obtain a warrant where reasonable suspicion is present, therefore allowing the search of 
the individual’s home, including closets); see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14 
(1997) (providing searches based on individualized suspicion generally do not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, however, “special needs” exceptions exist which require the Court to 
“undertake a context-specific inquiry”).  But see Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 36 
(2000) (noting the city’s narcotic checkpoints did not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
24 See Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009) 
(suggesting DNA testing has an “unparalleled ability” to significantly improve 
investigative practices, the criminal justice system, and exonerate the wrongly convicted); 
see also Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Upholds Maryland Law, Says Police May Take DNA 
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method, one technique exercised by law enforcement to obtain DNA 
samples, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.25  The 
technique is one performed in a variety of settings and has proven to be 
quick and painless—factors of key importance in the determination of its 
reasonableness.26 
Before the Court’s decision in King, federal and state courts have 
reached conflicting opinions on the constitutionality of DNA collection 
among those convicted, but not yet sentenced for felony crimes.27  In 
2011, the Court of Appeals found in People v. Buza that the seizure of 
DNA from someone who is entitled to the presumption of innocence 
violated the Fourth Amendment.28  However, in 2013 the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in King to determine whether the Fourth Amendment 
prohibits collection and analysis of a DNA sample from persons 
arrested, but not yet convicted on felony charges.29 
                                                                                                             
Samples from Arrestees, WASH. POST (June 3, 2013), www.washingtonpost.com/ 
politics/supreme-court-upholds-maryland-law-says-police-may-take-dna-samples-from-
arrestees/2013/06/03/0b619ade-cc5a-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X6VA-TPJ9 (discussing DNA as a “powerful tool” for law enforcement to 
solve cold cases). 
25 See Maryland v. King (King II), 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013) (“[i]t can be agreed that 
using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s check in order to obtain DNA 
samples is a search”); see also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769–70 (1966) 
(establishing that any intrusion into the human body is a search for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
26 Compare King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1969 (noting the process of obtaining a DNA sample 
using a buccal swab is a “gentle” method that can be completed with a light touch inside 
the individual’s cheek), with Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759–60 (1985) (discussing a 
surgical intrusion beneath an individual’s skin as a search in which reasonableness is 
determined on a “case-by-case” basis), and Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Assn., 489 
U.S. 602, 616–17 (1989) (determining a breathalyzer test that requires “deep lung” 
production is a search), and Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1564, 1568 (2013) 
(reviewing the withdrawal of blood on an individual by police officers as a search 
requiring a “totality of the circumstances” approach). 
27 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1966.  The question of whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits 
DNA collection and analysis of individuals arrested, but not yet convicted, has resulted in 
different conclusions between state and federal courts.  See generally State v. Raines, 857 
A.2d 19, 43–44 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004) (holding the Maryland DNA Collection Act, 
which requires DNA collection and analysis from certain convicted individuals, does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment).  But see People v. Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 782–83 (Ct. 
App. 2011) (finding that the DNA and Forensic Identification Data Base and Data Bank Act 
of 1998 violated the Fourth Amendment because it required felony arrestees to give a DNA 
sample). 
28 See Buza, 129 Cal. Rptr. 3d. at 755 (holding that the seizure of DNA from someone 
arrested, but not yet convicted, violates the Fourth Amendment because the individual is 
entitled to presumed innocence). 
29 See supra Part II (providing the factual background of Maryland v. King). 
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IV.  ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION IN MARYLAND V. KING 
A. The Maryland v. King Decision 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court held that DNA 
identification of arrestees on serious criminal offenses is a reasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment that can be considered part of 
routine booking procedures.30  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy 
began by promoting an educational understanding of DNA followed by 
language pulled from Maryland law outlining specific situations for 
approved DNA collection.31  Justice Kennedy ensured the application of 
the Fourth Amendment was a “beginning point” in the Court’s analysis 
of the presented issue.32  To support his argument, Justice Kennedy 
articulated five principle interests the Act serves to promote:  (1) 
properly identifying the arrested individual; (2) ensuring the detainee 
does not present risks for himself or others; (3) ensuring the accused is 
available for trial; (4) reviewing arrestee’s past conduct to assess 
potential danger; and (5) possibly freeing the wrongfully convicted.33 
                                                 
30 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1965, 1980 (finding that DNA identification of an arrested 
individual is considered part of “routine booking procedure[s]”).  The Court compared 
DNA sampling to fingerprinting and photographing.  Id.  The majority in King consisted of 
Justice Kennedy, who delivered the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices 
Thomas, Breyer, and Alito.  Id.  Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion with whom Justices 
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined.  Id. at 1980. 
31 See id. at 1966–67 (reciting the procedures for DNA collection and analysis); MD. CODE 
REGS. 29.05.01.04 (2014) (outlining when DNA collection may occur and supplemental 
guidelines for the process of obtaining a DNA sample); Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) 
on the CODIS Program and the National DNA Index System, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/lab/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet (last visited Mar. 4, 2015), archived at 
http://perma.cc/K36E-KKEN (discussing the background of CODIS and NDIS and 
providing general information on DNA).  According to the FBI, “CODIS was designed to 
compare . . . DNA records.”  Id.  After an identified match, the laboratories that are 
involved in the process exchange information for the purpose of verifying the match.  Id. 
32  King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1969. 
33 See id. at 1971–75 (explaining the Court’s reasoning on each of the five principle 
interests).  The Court explained with the first principle that “[i]n every criminal case, it is 
known and must be known who has been arrested and who is being tried.” Id. at 1971 
(quoting Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., Humboldt Cnty., 542 U.S. 177, 191 
(2004)); see also Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing the steps an 
individual engaged in criminal conduct will take to conceal his identity, such as, providing 
false information about his identity and criminal records).   
Justice Kennedy, while discussing the second principle, stated, “law enforcement 
officers bear a responsibility for ensuring that the custody of an arrestee does not create 
inordinate ‘risks for facility staff, for the existing detainee population, and for a new 
detainee.’”  King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1972 (quoting Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of 
Cnty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 1510, 1518 (2012)).  For safety reasons, among others, law 
enforcement officers must know the type of individual he or she is dealing with during 
detainment so the officer is able to make critical choices on how to proceed.  Id.  DNA 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 17
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The Court promptly affirmed the use of a buccal swab on an 
individual’s cheek to obtain a DNA sample does constitute a search 
under the Fourth Amendment.34  Rather than evaluate an individualized 
suspicion, the Court applied the test set forth in Illinois v. McArthur 
balancing privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns.35  
Abrogating Buza, Justice Kennedy discarded King’s argument that the 
search was unreasonable.36  For support, Justice Kennedy compared the 
buccal method to more invasive means of obtaining a sample, such as 
surgical intrusion beneath the skin or blood withdrawal.37  Additionally, 
the Court supported its decision by identifying “the need for law 
                                                                                                             
identification is one way that an officer can attain that critical information.  Id.  The Court 
went on to recognize “that a name alone cannot address this interest in identity.”  Id. 
The Court further discussed the third principle by analyzing Bell v. Wolfish, where 
“the Government has a substantial interest in ensuring that persons accused of crimes are 
available for trials.” Id. at 1972–73 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979)).  In Bell, 
the Court acknowledged the interest of the state in making persons available for trials was 
an undisputed issue.  Bell, 441 U.S. at 534. 
 For support for the fourth principle, Justice Kennedy relied on both Maryland rules 
and the United States Code, stating “the history and characteristics of the person, including 
the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial 
resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history 
relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at 
court proceedings” are taken into consideration in determining whether the individual 
may be released.  18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A) (2006 ed. & Supp. V); King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1973. 
Finally, the Court noted that the identification of an arrestee may free a person 
wrongfully imprisoned.  King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1973; see also JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & 
BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 245 (2000) (“Prompt [DNA] testing . . . would speed 
up apprehension of criminals before they commit additional crimes, and prevent the 
grotesque detention of . . . innocent people.”). 
34 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1968–69 (acknowledging that a buccal swab to collect DNA 
does constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
35 See 531 U.S. 326, 331 (2001) (discussing a balancing test of private-interests and 
government-interests to determine if a search is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).  
In McArthur, the Court addressed the issue of whether the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated when a police officer refused to allow the individual into his home 
unaccompanied by another officer until a search warrant was obtained.  Id. at 329.  The 
Court held the search was a reasonable seizure and that it did not violate the Fourth 
Amendment.  Id. at 338. 
36 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1966, 1979–80 (abrogating People v. Buza, the Court held that 
the California statute requiring DNA collection of persons arrested, but not yet convicted, 
with an entitlement of presumed innocence violates the Fourth Amendment). 
37 See id. at 1969 (comparing different methods of obtaining DNA).  Justice Kennedy 
explained a buccal swab as compared to a “surgical intrusion beneath the skin” is a search, 
but unlike that latter, it is far less invasive.  Id. (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 
(1985)); see also Winston, 470 U.S. at 760 (stating a balancing inquiry must be done to 
determine the reasonableness of a search where surgical intrusion beneath the skin is 
performed); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966) (finding the blood testing of 
an individual suspected of drunk driving was reasonable under the circumstances to 
secure evidence of blood-alcohol content). 
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enforcement . . . to process and identify the persons and possessions they 
must take into custody” as the government’s primary served interest 
through the Act.38  
Justice Kennedy drew additional support, in that like fingerprinting, 
DNA identification is also part of the booking procedure following a 
lawful arrest.39  Citing the Hodgeman v. Olsen opinion, Justice Kennedy 
stated the procedures implemented after arrest were used to “facilitate 
the recapture of escaped prisoners, to aid the investigation of their past 
records and personal history, and to preserve the means of identification 
for . . . future supervision after discharge.”40  Dismissing King’s 
objection, that DNA identification is null compared to fingerprinting due 
to the time delay in its analysis, Justice Kennedy urged the acceptance of 
technological advances to speed up and improve DNA identification.41 
Finally, Justice Kennedy distinguished King’s situation from 
Chandler v. Miller and Indianapolis v. Edmond—both scenarios the Court 
has previously referenced as “special needs” searches.42  Justice Kennedy 
                                                 
38 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1970 (stating the government’s interest in the Maryland DNA 
Collection Act is “well established”).  Justice Kennedy stated “the need for law 
enforcement officers in a safe and accurate way to process and identify the persons and 
possessions they must take into custody” is a legitimate government interest.  Id.; see also 
Gernstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112–14 (1975) (discussing how probable cause allows for 
the arrest of an individual suspected of a crime, as well as time to take administrative steps 
following arrest). 
39  See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1975 (explaining that law enforcement has implemented 
scientific advancements into routine booking procedures).  The Court discussed how DNA 
identification, similar to fingerprinting, is a “permissible tool” that is used by law 
enforcement.  Id. at 1977; see also Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58 (1991) 
(arguing that one way to reduce the likelihood of an innocent individual spending time in 
jail is to determine probable cause after “administrative steps incident to arrest”).  See 
generally Jessica A. Levitt, Note, Competing Rights Under the Totality of the Circumstances Test:  
Expanding DNA Collection Statutes, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 117, 121–27 (2011) (comparing DNA 
to fingerprinting, and discussing the potential expansion of DNA testing). 
40 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1975 (citing Hodgeman v. Olsen, 86 Wash. 615, 619 (1915)).  The 
Court stressed that the reasoning behind taking identifying information goes beyond 
verifying the individual’s name.  Id. 
41 See id. at 1976–77 (discussing the goals of DNA and recent advances to improve the 
delay in processing DNA).  The Court highlighted the FBI as an indicator that DNA testing 
will continue to develop allowing for rapid analysis.  Id. 
42 See id. at 1978 (distinguishing King’s situation from “special needs” searches); see also 
Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 313–14 (1997) (noting that exceptions exist when 
determining the reasonableness of a search under the Fourth Amendment).  Chandler 
explained that when “special needs” are alleged, courts must inquire as to the context of 
the search, “examining closely the competing private and public interests.”  Id.; see also 
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40–42 (2000) (reviewing checkpoint programs).  The 
Court in Edmond found that the checkpoints were unconstitutional “[b]ecause the primary 
purpose of the . . . checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal 
wrongdoing, . . . [which] contravenes the Fourth Amendment.”  Id. at 41–42. 
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supported his decision stating “searches of either the public at large or a 
particular class of regulated but otherwise law-abiding citizens” as the 
critical difference between King and the aforementioned.43  Justice 
Kennedy announced King’s status as a detainee resulted in a reduced 
expectation of privacy, unlike individuals subjected to special needs 
searches who have not been suspected of a wrong.44 
B. Appraisal of the Maryland v. King Decision 
The Court in Maryland v. King reached the correct result.45  The 
Maryland DNA Collection Act does not violate the Fourth Amendment 
because it satisfies the reasonable test set forth under judicial 
precedent.46  Adhering to the constraints of the test, King’s private 
interests were of a diminished scope from the moment his lawful arrest 
was executed.47  The interests of the government, fully acknowledged by 
the Court, rise to a level that significantly outweighs an incarcerated 
individual.48  Furthermore, the act of acquiring information at the time of 
booking from an arrested person is one of dated acceptance among 
society.49  Because King was convicted of a serious crime, obtaining a 
sample of his DNA is another necessary step in the procedural aspect of 
                                                 
43 King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1978.  The Court directly referred to the situation in Chandler, 
where law-abiding citizens may be searched under cases deemed “special needs” without a 
warrant.  Id. (quoting Chandler, 520 U.S. at 314). 
44 See id. at 1978 (discussing the differences in privacy among detainees and individuals 
who have not been suspected of a wrong).  Justice Kennedy noted that individuals in 
custody have a “diminished scope” regarding their expectation of privacy.  Id. (quoting Bell 
v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557 (1979)). 
45  See generally State v. Raines, 383 Md. 1, 43 (2004) (holding that the DNA Collection 
Act, which allows the collection of DNA samples from certain convicted persons, did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment). 
46 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1970–75 (weighing the private interests of King as a convicted 
person with a reduced expectation of privacy against five key governmental interests); see 
also supra note 33 and accompanying text (listing the five factors that the court used to 
balance the reasonableness of the search in King). 
47 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 (1979) (discussing the diminished scope of 
detainees in regard to their private interests); see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 
35–36 (1979) (stating the lawful arrest of an individual standing alone will authorize a 
search).  The Court in DeFillippo acknowledged that an officer is allowed to arrest an 
individual absent a warrant if probably cause exists.  Id. 
48 See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURES § 5.3 (5th ed. 2012) (reviewing the 
government’s interest in knowing, with certainty, the identity of the arrested individual, 
whether the person is wanted in a different location, and ensuring the individual’s 
identification should he avoid prosecution). 
49 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1976 (noting the practice of photographing and fingerprinting 
an individual in lawful custody has been widely accepted since the mid-twentieth century); 
see also Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 58 (1991) (discussing fingerprinting 
and booking procedures as part of “the administrative steps incident to arrest”). 
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processing him that serves to protect the interests of many, present and 
future.50 
C. Anticipated Consequences of the Maryland v. King Decision 
The holding in King is one that will rock the foundation of search 
and seizures jurisprudence.51  Conflicting conclusions have been drawn 
amongst federal and state courts regarding the constitutionality of DNA 
searches of those arrested, but not yet convicted for some time.52  The 
Court’s liberals joined conservative Justice Scalia in a heated dissent that 
mocked the majority’s ruling.53  The unexpected division between the 
Court’s justices plays a significant role in framing future consequences.54  
As the dissent noted, the idea that DNA withdrawal from any individual 
arrested under any line of reasoning will now be deemed permissible 
based on this Court’s ruling; the debate amongst judicial authority and 
libertarians will only be further enticed.55  In addition, the holding in 
King will serve as a mere starting point for what will likely become a 
                                                 
50 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1973 (stating the importance of knowing with certainty an 
arrested individual’s identification to assess future threat or danger to others); see also 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749–50 (1987) (discussing the prevention of crime by 
an arrestee as both “legitimate and compelling”). 
51 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority 
decision by stating that “[t]he Fourth Amendment forbids searching a person for evidence 
of a crime when there is no basis for believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in 
possession of incriminating evidence”).  Justice Scalia passionately asserted the majority’s 
reasoning that DNA is being taken to identify detainees is one that “taxes the credulity of 
the credulous.”  Id. 
52 See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing the contrasting opinions of courts 
on matters similarly related to Maryland v. King). 
53 See supra Part IV.A (providing a synopsis of the Court’s decision in Maryland v. King); 
see also Barnes, supra note 24 (discussing the dissent’s disagreement with the majority 
opinion, specifically the use of DNA collection and testing to identify King). 
54 See Akhil Reed Amar & Neal K. Katyal, Why the Court was Right to Allow Cheek Swabs, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/opinion/why-the-court-was-
right-to-allow-cheek-swabs.html?_r=1&, archived at  http://perma.cc/2GBR-ZNR7 
(reviewing the impact of Justice Scalia, a known conservative, joining the Court’s liberals in 
a heated dissent).  Amar and Katyal pointed to the fact that Justice Scalia dissented from 
the bench—“a race act that signals sharp disagreement.”  Id. 
55  See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (mocking the majority’s decision as 
one that will negatively impact future decisions regarding DNA withdrawal).  Justice 
Scalia, dissenting, predicts that as a result of the Court’s decision, DNA sampling and 
analysis may be taken from any individual arrested and for whatever reason.  Id.; see also 
Totenberg, supra note 1 (stating civil libertarians were disappointed with the Court’s 
decision). 
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long era of constitutional questioning in regard to technological 
advances concerning DNA sampling.56 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The idea that certain arrested, but not yet convicted, individuals may 
be subject to DNA searches that are constitutionally sound is one, that, 
before King, appeared unreasonable.  Both state and federal courts alike 
struggled to agree on an appropriate answer to the Fourth Amendment 
issue.  The Court decidedly advocated for reasonableness as the primary 
factor in deciding constitutionality.  As such, the King decision will push 
future cases to identify the interests of the government and private 
citizens in a balancing test to determine reasonableness.  Based on King, 
law enforcement will reap the benefits of the DNA search method as an 
investigative tool that continues to grow and develop with technology.  
Furthermore, like Maryland, states with similar enacted legislation will 
enable law enforcement to pursue DNA searches as a mere extension of 
the accepted booking procedures.  While Alonzo King was justly 
arrested for assault, because of the ruling in King, both he and future 
criminals will become residents in a DNA databank. 
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56 See King II, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting)  (discussing the Court’s current 
position on DNA collection and testing of persons arrested, but not yet convicted of serious 
crimes, and posing the platform for future discussion in light of the heated debate between 
the majority and dissent). 
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